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Bequests for Religious Services
James T. Brennan*
T WO TECHNICAL LEGAL OBJECTIONS may be raised to bequests for re-
ligious services: lack of a definite human beneficiary and the rule
against perpetuities. The lack of a human beneficiary is the primary
objection, since the rule against perpetuities is measured in terms of
human lives, except for the gross period of twenty-one years in most
jurisdictions.
Charitable uses, uses lacking a definite human beneficiary, were per-
mitted' even prior to the Statute of Charitable Uses.2 There was un-
certainty on this point however in the United States immediately fol-
lowing the Revolutionary War.3 Once bequests are permitted which are
not for the benefit of specific persons, the inapplicability of a limitation
measured in terms of human lives becomes apparent. Thus the rule
against perpetuities is not applied to charitable gifts.4
The only English common law which might be construed as author-
ity for permitting religious uses is found in the Preamble to the Statute
of Elizabeth which states ". . . some for repair of . . . churches . . .";
however, gifts for the advancement of religion are clearly charitable
today.5
The distinction between charitable and private trusts is that the
charitable trust is for general purposes which will benefit society rather
than a specific person whereas the private trust is for the benefit of a
specific human being. "Charitable" purposes are defined by the common
law,6 broadened in many states by statute. 7 The rule against perpetuities
is no longer enforced against the continuance of charitable trusts, but
continues to apply to honorary trusts,8 even though the inappropriate-
ness of measuring gifts, for the accomplishment of specific purposes not
directly benefiting human beneficiaries, in terms of human lives is ob-
*Ass't Prof. of Law, Syracuse University.
1 Vidal v. Girard's Ex'r, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 127, 11 L.Ed. 205 (1844).
2 43 Eliz., c. 4 (1601).
3 Trustees of Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1819)
which held a gift for a perpetual fund for the education of Baptist youths void for
indefiniteness of beneficiaries since Virginia had passed an act repealing all English
statutes, and since the act felt charitable trusts had been established by statute it
was reasoned that there could thus be no charitable trusts in Virginia.
4 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 365 (1959); Restatement of Property § 398 (1944).
5 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 368 and § 371 (1959).
6 Id. at § 368.
7 See the Estates, Powers and Trust Law (New York) § 8-1.1.
8 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 124 (1959); In re Estate of Searight, 87 Ohio App.
417, 95 N.E. 2d 779 (1950).
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vious. The apparent reason is that some time limitation is needed on the
length of time during which gifts may be dedicated to noncharitable
purposes which do not directly benefit any human beneficiary; and the
courts have been, or at least have felt themselves, unable to develop any
more appropriate limitation.
Thus the questions we are concerned with are: is a bequest for the
performance of religious services valid at all, and if valid, is the bequest
for the performance of religious services charitable in nature or may it
be upheld only as an honorary trust?
If a bequest for the performance of religious services is not regarded
as charitable and upheld only as an honorary trust, then it may be de-
feated if: the transferee of the property does not voluntarily apply it to
the designated purpose; the direction violates the applicable rule against
perpetuities; or the purpose is capricious. 9 While the purposes with
which we are concerned would not normally be regarded as capricious,
the amount of the gift might be. In such an event any amount of prop-
erty in excess of a reasonable amount should be held by the transferee
as a resulting trust for the residuary legatee or heirs as the case may be.
It should be noted that while honorary trusts have been recognized in
Ohio, 10 by some other jurisdictions and by legal scholars, the validity of
honorary trusts remains an open question in many jurisdictions.
Today gifts for religious purposes are special favorites of the law."
This was not always the case.12 Our ancestors were far more concerned
than we are about the amount of society's property which was dedicated
to religious and charitable purposes. 13 It is possible that at some future
time our society will face serious social problems created by the dedi-
cation of a disproportionate amount of property to religious and chari-
table purposes; but at the present time, this possibility is remote.
Bequests for the Saying of Masses
Bequests for the saying of masses are universally held valid today.
There remains, however, considerable doubt as to the "correct" theoret-
9 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 124; Detwiller v. Hartman, 37 N.J. Eq. 347
(1883): here the court upheld a bequest of $40,000 for the erection of a tomb, but
held invalid a bequest to hire a band to play dirges on the grave of the testator on
the anniversary of his death. The latter violated the rule against perpetuities.
10 In re Estate of Searight, supra note 8.
11 In re Durbrow's Estate, 245 N.Y. 469, 157 N.E. 747 (1927); here it was held that
a testamentary gift for the general purpose of advancing Christ's kingdom on earth
was valid.
12 Professor John Curran notes in his article, Charitable Trusts for Masses, 5 De
Paul Law Review 246 (1956) that English courts held trusts for the saying of masses
invalid until 1919.
13 See discussion in 2 Scott on Trusts, § 371 (1967). Formerly the Constitution of
Missouri declared void every testamentary gift for the support of any minister or
religious sect. See also, Schmucker's Estate v. Reel, 61 Mo. 592 (1876).
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ical explanation for these decisions.14 Two major sets of variables add
to the confusion which is often compounded by a touch of judicial leger-
demain' 5 in favor of the bequests. The first major type of variable is the
language of the bequest. The second is the underlying reason for which
the issue of charitability has been raised.
The language of the bequest may create a funded trust with an
active trustee; 16 however, this type of bequest is relatively rare. More
often the executor is directed to have masses said for the testator's soul1 7
and frequently for the souls of others as well. The inclusion of masses
for persons other than the testator does not affect the validity of the
bequest.' 8
Often the bequest will be to specific named priests for the saying of
masses.19 In such instances the named priest may predecease the testator
14 This was sometimes the case in England before In re Caus, 1 Ch. 162 (1934), when
gifts for masses were first held to be charitable trusts; Reichenbach v. Quinn, 21 L.R.
Ir. 138: an Iowa court held that although a gift in trust for the saying of masses was
not valid as a charitable trust, the trust was valid nonetheless. Wilmes v. Tiernay,
187 Ia. 390, 174 N.W. 271 (1919); Moran v. Kelley, 124 A. 67 (N.J. Ch. 1924): the
court upheld a bequest of the entire residue in trust to be employed to have masses
said for the happy repose of the testator's soul. The court stated: "It is to be noted
that the bequest is to definite persons, in trust for a specific purpose, and creates
a use intended for the benefit of the testator specifically. Such a use, when possess-
ing those elements of definiteness, is sustained, generally, by the American author-
ities. .. "
15 Lanza v. Di Fronzo, 92 N.E. 2d 299 (1949).
16 In re Reilly's Estate, 138 Ohio St. 145, 33 N.E. 2d 987 (1941) there was such a trust:
"I give and bequeath to M. James Roche ... or in the event that he shall not survive
me, or be incapable to act, I nominate and appoint the Cleveland Trust Company of
Cleveland, Ohio, as such trustee, the sum of.ten thousand dollars ($10,000), in trust,
however, for the uses and purposes following, to wit: To hold, manage, control,
invest and reinvest the same, and out of the income and principal thereof to pay to
the pastor of the Immaculate Conception Roman Catholic Church of Cleveland, Ohio,
and to the pastor of St. Mary's Roman Catholic Church, Brookpark Road, Cleveland,
Ohio, the sum of not less than five dollars ($5) each weekly, for the purpose of sing-
ing high masses for the repose of the souls of my father, mother and myself; and to
the pastors of the Franciscan Roman Catholic churches located at Woodland Avenue
and East 23rd St., and Rocky River Drive in Cleveland, Ohio, the sum of not less
than five dollars ($5) weekly jointly for the purposes of saying low masses for the
repose of the souls of my father, my mother and myself."
17 Such a direction was contained in the rest, residue, and remainder clause of the
will in In re Shanahan's Estate, 159 Ohio St. 487, 112 N.E. 2d 665 (1953). ". . . I direct
my executrix to expend one-sixth for Masses, according to the ritual of the Roman
Catholic Church, for the repose of my soul. I further direct my executrix to expend
two-thirds of such total for such Masses for the repose of my soul, the souls of my
parents, Bartholomew and Margaret Shanahan, and the souls of my brothers, John,
Maurice, Bartholomew and Frank Shanahan. I direct that all inheritance, succession,
legacy or estate taxes on any legacy made in this my will be paid out of the remain-
der of such total. .. "
18 "We have no doubt that a trust for the saying of masses for one's soul or for the
souls of others-if otherwise valid-is good as a charitable trust." Sedgwick v. Na-
tional Savings and Trust Co., 130 F.2d 440 (4th Cir. 1942).
19 In re Liebeck's Estate, 109 N.Y.S. 2d 147 (1951): "I give and bequeath the sum of
Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00) to Rev. Sebastian B. Englerth, Rector of St. John's
Evangelist Church, Greece, New York, to be used as he may see fit for Church pur-
poses. I also give and bequeath to the said Rev. Sebastian B. Englerth the sum of
Two hundred dollars ($200.00), to be used for the saying of masses for the repose of
my soul."
May, 1968
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and the question arises as to whether or not the legacy lapses.20 In these
cases the courts hold that there is a trust rather than a legacy and the
gift does not lapse.2' In other instances the bequest is either to the holder
of a specified office 22 or to a church.23 Bequests to churches have been
attacked on the grounds that unincorporated associations can't take
property, but these attacks have been unsuccessful.24 Finally, there are
the directions to no definite individual that masses be said.25
In a very excellent article, "Seventy Years of Bequests for Masses
in New York Courts 1883-1953," 26 the authors, O'Brien and O'Brien,
maintain that in every instance, but those in which a funded trust with
an active trustee is established, dedication of property should be char-
acterized as powers in trust. Their reason is that the donee of the power
actually contracts27 with a priest to say the masses, and even the priest
is not entitled to the money for his own use until he has performed the
mass. Thus even in the instances where a specific priest is named to say
the masses, he is not a legatee. There is much force in this argument
particularly in those states which have the New York Revised Statutes'
statutory scheme of powers; however, even the New York courts do not
speak of bequests to say masses in the language of powers.28 They use
the language of trusts, although it is clear that rarely is any funded trust
which is to be separately administered involved. An Ohio case upholds
the validity of a dedication of property for the saying of masses.29 In
20 Ibid.
21 Matter of Idem's Will, 256 App. Div. 124, 8 N.Y.S. 2d 970 (1939), aff'd 280 N.Y. 756,
21 N.E. 2d 522 (1939); In re Liebeck's Will, supra note 19. Matter of Neary, 194 Misc.
201, 86 N.Y.S. 2d 312 (1949).
22 "Mrs. Brown's will, so far as here material, gave a legacy of $500 to the pastor of
St. John's Church . . . Brooklyn, 'to be used for the saying of masses for the repose
of the souls of myself and of my husband. '" Matter of Brown, 135 Misc. 611, 238
N.Y.S. 160 (1929).
23 Sedgwick v. Nat'l Savings & Trust Co., supra note 18, "Item III. All of the rest,
residue and remainder of my estate and property, of whatsoever character, whenso-
ever acquired and wheresoever situate, including all estate and property to or in
which I shall have any right title, claim or interest whatsoever at the time of my
death, I give, devise and bequeath, in fee simple and in absolute estate, unto the
Holy Name Cathedral, State and Superior Streets, Chicago, Illinois, for masses for
the repose of my soul."
24 Lanza v. Di Fronzo, supra note 15; Matter of Korzeniewska, 163 Misc. 323, 297
N.Y.S. 997 (1937); Matter of Idem's Will, supra note 21.
25 Lanza v. Di Fronzo, supra note 15. "The balance of my estate to go for Masses
for the repose of the souls of myself and my beloved wife, Maria Di Fronzo.
26 23 Fordham L. Rev. 147 (1954).
27 Perhaps a somewhat unhappy secular choice of language. According to The
Canon Laws of Wills, at 402, paragraph 673, Father Hannan states: "A Mass cannot
be bought, because its infinite supernatural value transcends any equivalent in ma-
terial wealth. The Priest has the power to offer this Sacrifice; the layman, not. The
latter cannot buy the favor, and the former cannot sell it. But, by accepting the gift
of the latter, the former binds himself to bestow the favor on the donor rather than
on some other man who has not shown benevolence to him."
28 Morris v. Edwards, 227 N.Y. 141, 124 N.E. 724 (1919).
29 Lanza v. Di Fronzo, supra note 15.
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that case the court spoke of the direction for the saying of masses as a
valid charitable trust.
3 0
Two Ohio cases have held dedications of property for the saying of
masses subject to the Ohio succession tax.3 1 In re Reilly's Estate32 the
court held that a funded trust with an active trustee is subject to the
succession tax and not exempted as "or to or for the use of an institution
for purposes only of public charity." 33 In re Shanahan's Estate34 the
court held that a direction to the executrix to have masses said is subject
to the succession tax. Since money given to a priest to pay his expenses
does not, in reality inure to the priest for his personal benefit, but rather
to the benefit of the church, it might be that the result in the Shanahan
case should be reexamined, since this ground for considering the dedi-
cation exempt does not appear in the probate court decision. 5
In states which either hold wills executed in favor of charities in-
valid if executed within a certain period prior to death, or which have
a statutory restriction on the percentage of a person's estate which may
be given to charities, the question will arise as to whether dedications
of property for the saying of masses fall within these statutes.36 The
cases are in conflict, 37 often even within the same jurisdiction.38 It would
seem that the purpose of these statutes is as applicable to the dedication
of property for the saying of masses as it is to gifts to hospitals, univer-
sities, etc. The small size of some of these gifts and the preferred posi-
tion of religious institutions are probably the causes for contrary results.
It is submitted that these statutes should be applied to the dedication of
property for the saying of masses.
Where a named priest has predeceased the testator, the simplest
means for effectuating the testator's primary desire to have masses said
is to declare the gift a charitable trust, apply the cy pres doctrine and
appoint another priest to say the masses.39 Such bequests would perhaps
be more appropriately conceived of as directions to the executor than
as charitable trusts, legacies or powers in trust. Treating such directions
30 Lanza v. Di Fronzo, 92 N.E. 2d 299 at 301 (1949): "On February 14, 1938, this
Court in an unreported decision (Case No. 244751) in a matter to construe a will
(Margaret M. Dempsey v. Christ the King Church) found that income to be used
for the saying of Masses created a valid charitable trust."
31 There are no cases on the deductibility of bequests for the saying of masses under
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2055 (2).
32 138 Ohio St. 145, 33 N.E. 2d 989 (1941).
33 General Code of Ohio, § 5334.
34 In re Shanahan's Estate, supra note 17.
35 Ibid.
36 Lanza v. Di Fronzo, supra note 15.
37 Annot., 111 A.L.R. 525 (1937).
38 See O'Brien and O'Brien, Seventy Years of Bequests for Masses in New York
Courts 1883-1953, 23 Fordham L. Rev. 147 (1954).
39 This was done in In re Liebeck's Will, supra note 19.
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as charitable trusts leads to the application of funds which were directed
to be used for the saying of masses to other charitable purposes. In in
re Jeglich's Will 40 the executors held one half of the residue in trust for
the saying of masses.41 The successor church declined to say masses for
a period of more than two years. It is rather difficult to understand how
the church ever declined since this case involved a funded trust, and as
such it was the duty of the executors as trustees to administer it. From
the income and possibly the principal they should have periodically
arranged for the saying of masses. In any event, the court applied the
cy pres doctrine to the excess of the trust over the amount required for
the saying of masses for two years. It ordered the excess distributed to
the Passionist Monastery of the Immaculate Conception in Jamaica, New
York. This appears to be a rather dubious use of the cy pres doctrine.
The reason probably is that if bequests for the saying of masses were
regarded as honorary trusts, the courts should have the power to permit
the transferee to exercise the power only as to a reasonable amount of
the property appropriate to the decedent's state in life. When the be-
quest is regarded as charitable, the court does not have this power.
In matter of Backes42 the testatrix directed her executors "To cause
masses to be read in a German Catholic church in the city of Buffalo, for
herself and her deceased husband, from any balance of cash money
which might be left after the payment of her just debts, doctor bills and
funeral expenses." The surrogate only permitted an amount in accord-
ance with the testatrix's station in life to be used for masses and the
remainder was distributed as though she had died intestate. The limita-
tion of dedication of property for the saying of masses according to the
station in life of the testator was abolished in Morris v. Edwards.4 3 In
that case the executor wished to distribute the residue of approximately
$5,500 as intestate property despite the language of the will: "I bequeath
all . . . the residue . . . to my executor . . . to pay funeral expenses, say
masses, and put a modest tombstone over my remains." The court held
that the executor held the residue in trust and stated that the testatrix
was free to judge what was a reasonable amount of money for these
purposes.
Occasionally the question may arise whether bequests for the saying
of masses are to come ahead of the general legacies, or are to be treated
40 178 N.Y.S. 2d 363 (1959).
41 "Sixth: All the rest, residue and remainder of my property, both real and per-
sonal, of whatsoever nature and kind and wheresoever the same may be situated, I
direct my executors, hereinafter named, to hold the same in trust for the following
purposes:
b) I hereby direct my executors, hereinafter named, to have a Mass offered for
the repose of the immortal souls of my late husband, John Jeglich and myself at St.
Teresa's Roman Catholic Church in Sunnyside, New York, every three (3) months."
42 9 Misc. 504, 30 N.Y.S. 394 (1894).
4' Morris v. Edwards, supra note 28.
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as funeral expenses. In Matter of Dwyer 44 the court held that a $500
item for masses was an expense. This case appears wrong in principle,
and the great weight of cases hold that bequests for masses do not take
precedence over general legacies and are not expenses. 45 However, it
would seem that the funeral mass should be treated as an expense, even
though not an absolutely necessary part of the funeral services.
46
At one time gifts for the saying of masses were considered super-
stitious uses and against public policy.47 More recently a trust to propa-
gate the teachings of Joanna Southcote, who claimed she was with child
by the Holy Ghost and that a second Messiah was to be born of her body,
was upheld.
48
The average adherent to any religion is not a doctor of theology. It
is believed that the vast majority of testators who wish to have masses
said for their souls and the souls of their family intend to benefit them-
selves and their family in the Afterlife. There is likely no thought on
their part that the masses they provide to be said should benefit others.
From this point of view the dedication of property for the saying of
masses for the testator or his family could hardly be characterized as
charitable.
In in re Beckwoldt's Estate,49 the surrogate judge expressed the fol-
lowing opinion which frequently reoccurs in the reported cases:
Whereas such a gift may be made to a religious society, it is not for
a general religious purpose since its object is not to promote religion
as a whole, but . . . according to tenets of the Roman Catholic and
Jewish faiths, to secure for the testator a particular individual bene-
fit, by promoting the eternal welfare of his soul ...
As a matter of first impression and in the absence of controlling
authority, this court would be of the opinion that this direction could
not properly be deemed to fall within the terms of this statute. The
varieties of gifts generally considered to be within its description are
those which contemplate a general benefit to mankind or to an in-
definite but appreciable segment thereof, in other words, those which
evince a general charitable and benevolent purpose for the advance-
ment of the public welfare. (Citations omitted.) In the present
44 192 App. Div. 72, 182 N.Y.S. 64 (1920).
45 In re Nolan's Will, 99 N.Y.S. 2d 622 (1950); In re De Molina's Estate, 35 N.Y.S. 2d
24 (1942); Matter of McArdle, 147 Misc. 876, 264 N.Y.S. 764 (1933); Matter of Cun-
ningham, 140 Misc. 91, 249 N.Y.S. 439 (1931); Matter of Werrick, 135 Misc. 876, 239
N.Y.S. 740 (1930).
46 But see Matter of McAvoy's Estate, 112 App. Div. 377, 98 N.Y.S. 437 (1906).
47 In re Blundell's Trusts, 30 Beau. 360 (1861). West v. Shuttleworth, 2 Myl. and
K 684 (1835).
48 Thornton v. Howe, 31 Beau. 19, 54 Eng. Rep. 1042 (1862).
49 176 Misc. 549, 27 N.Y.S. 2d 938 (1941).
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instance no general benevolent conception is involved; no benefit to
the public as a whole was intended.
However, the court upheld the legacy as a valid gift for religious uses
because it felt itself to be bound by the decision in matter of Morris.50
The Surrogate's opinion expressed in in re Beckwoldt's Estate51 makes
the giver's motive important in determining whether or not a gift is
charitable, and recalls Mr. Binney's famous definition of a charity in
Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs.:
whatever is given for the love of God, or for the love of your neigh-
bor, in the catholic and universal sense-given from these motives,
and to these ends-free from the stain or taint of every consider-
ation that is personal, private or selfish.
Nevertheless, Professor Scott in his treatise on trusts52 states flatly
that, "It is not the motive which induces the giver to make his gift
which makes a gift charitable." Certainly in this day of tax avoidance
this is the correct statement of the law. The terms of the gift rather than
the motive of the giver must determine whether or not the gift is
charitable.
53
It appears to be the doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church that the
saying of masses is a benefit to the entire membership in the Catholic
church, both living and dead, and that any person participating in the
sacrifice of the mass gains spiritual benefit from his participation.5 4 Thus
the majority of modern courts have upheld the dedication of property for
the saying of masses as a charitable trust.55
There is little, if any, cost involved to the church in saying masses.
Often many individuals will be remembered in the same mass, and in
general, the mass would be said by a priest whether or not any gift had
been made. In this way gifts for the saying of masses (and in the Jew-
ish faith Yahrzeit) differ from gifts for the care of cemetery lots or the
care of animals. They are, in fact, gifts to the church or religious organ-
ization, though in the form of service contracts, because the church
would perform the religious service in any event. From these bequests
the church earns considerable income to devote to its general purposes.
50 227 N.Y. 141, 124 N.E. 724 (1920).
51 Supra note 49; supra note 1.
52 4 Scott on Trusts § 348 (1967).
53 See supra note 4 § 348.
54 According to Father Charles Borgognoni, Roman Catholic Chaplain of Syracuse
University.
55 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 371 (1959) comment (g). So held, Kerrigan v.
Tabb (N.J. Ch.), 39 A. 701 (1898); Matter of Dobbins, 206 Misc. 64, 132 N.Y.S. 2d 236
(1953); Mahoney v. Nollman, 309 Mass. 522, 35 N.E. 2d 265 (1941); Estate of Hamilton,
181 Cal. 758, 186 Pac. 587 (1919); Scott on Trusts, § 371.5.
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It appears to be the practice in the internal accounting of the Cath-
olic Church to treat a gift for a specified number of masses differently
from a gift for an indefinite number of masses for the soul of the donor.
Gifts for the saying of a specified number of masses are treated as
income to the priest who says the mass, whereas gifts coupled with a
request that an indefinite number of masses be said are treated as income
to the parish or organization to which the gift was made for the general
purposes of the parish or organization.
While gifts for the saying of a specified number of masses are treated
as income to the priest saying the masses as far as internal accounting
is concerned, this is not personal income to the priest within the ordinary
meaning of that term. To defray his expenses each priest is given a
maximum salary of $1500 per year. If he earns more than $1500 per year
by saying masses, he does not receive it; and it goes to the church to pay
the salary of the priests who do not earn enough to cover their expenses
by saying masses.
Hence, in effect, all gifts for the saying of masses are in reality gifts
to the general funds of the church and the church allocates these funds
in its internal accounting system to cover the expenses of its priests 6
It should be remembered that the motive of a testator making a gift
does not affect the determination of the question of whether or not a gift
is charitable. A gift is charitable if it is given for charitable purposes. 7
Since a gift for the advancement of religion is charitable, gifts for the
saying of masses should be regarded as charitable gifts. 58
In light of the foregoing, it appears that gifts for the saying of masses
are in reality gifts to the church; and any restrictions imposed on chari-
table trusts for religious purposes should apply equally to trusts for the
saying of masses. On the other hand, there seems no reason for imposing
restrictions on gifts for the saying of masses which are not imposed upon
other gifts to religious institutions.
In jurisdictions which do not consider trusts for the saying of masses
charitable trusts, they are usually upheld as honorary trusts.59 In these
jurisdictions the rule against perpetuities applies to trusts for the saying
of masses. 0 While it is believed that these jurisdictions are in error in
their classification, the only occasion on which this difference would, in
56 I am again indebted to Father Charles Borgognoni, Roman Catholic Chaplain of
Syracuse University for this information.
57 Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 368-374 (1959).
58 Supra note 55.
59 This was sometimes the case in England before In re Caus, 1 Ch. 162 (1934) when
gifts for masses were first held to be charitable trusts; Reichenbach v. Quinn, supra
note 14. An Iowa court held that although a gift in trust for the saying of masses
was not valid as a charitable trust, the trust was valid nonetheless. Wilmes v. Tier-
nay, supra note 14.
60 Restatement of Property § 370 and § 374 (1944); 2 Scott on Trusts § 124.1 (1967);
American Law of Property § 24.67; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 124 (1959).
May, 1968
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theory, lead to a different result in fact would be when such a bequest
would violate the rule against perpetuities. It is arguable that it is
sounder social policy to place some time limit on such dedications of
property. The basis for this argument is really that the rule against per-
petuities or some analogous rule should be applied to charitable gifts.
Perhaps this should be the law, but it is not.6'
Yahrzeit
Kaddish is said every day after the death of a Jewish person for 11
months, and thereafter yearly upon the anniversary of the person's death,
Yahrzeit. The general thrust of the language of the prayers is a glorifi-
cation of God rather than a plea for the deceased. However, many people
may feel that the prayer will do them spiritual good after their death,
and there is some Jewish legendary lore in support of this view.
Normally it is the duty of the eldest son to see that the Kaddish is
observed at Yahrzeit. The saying of the Kaddish plays an important role
in consoling the relatives of the deceased for the death of their kinsman.
Since the deceased was a member of the religious community and the
person saying the Kaddish is a member of the community, there is bene-
fit to the entire religious community from the saying of Kaddish.
Since it is the duty of the eldest son to see that Kaddish is said,
there will not normally be any formal arrangements made for the saying
of Kaddish unless there is no son or unless the parents feel that the son
will not perform his duty. In either of these instances a person may
leave a sum of money to a Jewish institution in order that the Kaddish
may be said at Yahrzeit.
The cost of saying Kaddish is purely nominal, and Kaddish would
probably be said on that day at the institution in any event.6 2 In effect,
a gift for the saying of Yahrzeit is an absolute gift to a religious institu-
tion of the sum involved for the general use of that institution, although
the gift is clearly coupled with a duty to say Kaddish at Yahrzeit. Such
gifts should be considered charitable gifts for the same reasons that gifts
to Roman Catholic institutions for the saying of masses should be con-
sidered charitable gifts. 3
It follows by analogy that all that is applicable to the dedication of
property for the saying of Masses should be applicable to dedications of
property for the saying of Kaddish at Yahrzeit.
61 Supra note 4 at § 365.
62 1 wish to express my appreciation to Dr. Milton Elefant, Jewish Chaplain of
Syracuse University for the information he supplied on Jewish customs and beliefs.
63 In Matter of Fleishfarb, 151 Misc. 399, 271 N.Y.S. 736 (1934); In Matter of Gold-
berg, 33 N.Y.S. 2d 1021 (1942).
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Other Rituals
It would seem that any religious ritual which would not be illegal
and against public policy may be provided for by the testator.64 The real
issues are still the size of the gift and the rule against perpetuities. The
chances are that today a provision for religious rituals for the benefit of
the deceased will be upheld as a charitable trust, and if not as a chari-
table trust, then as an honorary trust. It would seem prudent, however,
to make sure that a dedication of property for the performance of re-
ligious rituals of a socially unaccepted religious sect on behalf of the
decedent complies with the rule against perpetuities, for there is the
danger that a court might find the bequest for the exclusive benefit of
the deceased and hence not charitable.65 In addition, if a real trust fund
is established for the performance of rituals like placing candles or food
-on a grave, or the lighting of firecrackers, the money will not go to the
general use of an organized religious community in the same manner that
bequests for the saying of Masses or Yahrzeit go into the general funds
of the priesthoods of the Roman Catholic and Jewish religions.
It should be noted that whenever funds are not to be turned over
to the organized ministry of a religion to perform the desired religious
ritual, the funds must be held to be an active trust by a trustee. In such
instances there are good reasons based on public policy for limiting the
duration of the dedication of property to such specific purposes which
do not directly advance any religion to a period within the rule against
perpetuities.
Conclusion
The dedication of property for the saying of Masses or Kaddish at
Yahrzeit is a charitable use. The funds directed to be employed for these
purposes aid the advancement of the Roman Catholic and Jewish reli-
gions to the same extent as other gifts to religious organizations of these
faiths. In addition, the religious doctrines of these faiths declare that
the religious services benefit the entire community and not merely the
decedent remembered in the service. Probably, however, it would be
best for courts to avoid the theological thicket in deciding whether or not
a dedication of property for religious services is a charitable use. An
easy-to-apply objective test would be whether or not the funds dedicated
were turned over to the organized ministry of the religion for use in
64 See 2 Scott on Trusts § 371.4.
65 It was held in In re Estate of Khoo Cheng Teow, Straits Settlement L.R. 226
(1932), that a trust of land to apply the rents in performance of a Chinese religious
ritual Sin Chew to perpetuate the memory of the decedent was not a charitable trust;
however, since the trust did not violate the rule against perpetuities, the trust was
valid; whereas in Yeap Cheah Neo v. Ong Cheng Neo, L.R. 6 Probate Court 381
(1875) a bequest for the perpetual performance of a Chinese religious ritual was held
invalid.
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advancing the purposes of the religion. This test might not be met by
dedications of property for the performance of the rituals of certain
oriental and minority religious groups. However, in these instances
where no organized religion is being directly aided by contributions to
its general funds, the advancement of religion in the interest of the public
welfare is not being fostered and the duration of the dedication of prop-
erty to the specified purposes should be limited in time.
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